Given that scientific realism is based on the assumption that there is a connection between a model's predictive success and its truth, and given the success of multiple incompatible models in scientific practice, the realist has a problem. When the different models can be shown to arise as different approximations to a unified theory, however, one might think the realist to be able to accommodate such cases. I discuss a special class of models (generated as non-uniform limits of a unified theory) and argue that a realist interpretation has to understand these models of a system as 'perspectival', in close analogy to different spatial perspectives onto the same object. For this sort of case, I also respond to Morrison's recent claim that in the process of unifying models into an overarching theory, explanatory and descriptive power are lost, leaving the unified theory with less of a claim to a realist interpretation than the models themselves.
Introduction
In predicting the behaviour of one and the same natural system, scientists frequently use multiple models or theories 1 of the system that make mutually incompatible assumptions about the system. As anti-realists have noticed, this practice appears to cause a problem for scientific realists. Realists typically hold that there is a close connection between the predictive or descriptive success of a theory and its being at least approximately true. But if several theories of the same system are predictively successful, and if these theories are mutually inconsistent, they cannot all be true. This is the 'incompatible models argument' against scientific realism (see, for instance, Morrison [2000] , pp. 47-52). Although a general realist response to this argument may be elusive, the realist can point to those cases where the incompatible models can be understood as different approximations to a 'unified' theory; only the latter theory is then claimed to be literally true. The different approximations to T (standing henceforth for the unified theory) will be motivated for different circumstances. Perhaps the simplest implementation of this strategy is, or appears to be, to divide the system, described by T, into separate parts or regions and to derive the approximations to T for each region, given the special circumstances there. What might look like incompatible assumptions with respect to the whole system may turn out to be perfectly in harmony if assigned to separate, exclusive regions rather than to the system as a whole. Whenever such a division of the domain of T is possible, a realist interpretation of different models of T seems straightforward.
In this paper I want to explain why such an interpretation is not straightforward and how it can be constructed in a proper way. If we look at a widely applied procedure for obtaining separate models for different regions from a theory, we do not find support for the straightforward realist interpretation given above. This procedure does not result in separate models for separate regions of the system described, but derives different, incompatible models for the whole system. Although one could say that, in the end, only mutually exclusive regions of the models are going to be taken seriously, a more natural-and for the scientific realist more pleasing-interpretation is that these incompatible models are perspectival models of the whole domain. Even though they look as if they ascribed different intrinsic properties to the system (in different regions, ultimately), in truth these models describe the system relationally: from this perspective, the system looks as if it had intrinsic property x, from that perspective it looks like it has property y. This interpretation of the formalism should be pleasing to the realist because the fact that a system seems to have incompatible properties when viewed from different points of view is obviously no more of an embarrassment for the realist than that one and the same table can look like a square and like a trapezoid.
This sort of case allows us to also address a second, more general type of difficulty for the realist. Morrison has raised the concern that the inference to the truth of the unifying theory is blocked even in our kind of scenario because the models themselves typically are predictively and explanatorily more successful than the theory. Unification, she claims, is typically bought at the expense of detailed accounts of the systems in question; we lose predictive and explanatory power when we unify different models or theories into one overarching theoretical edifice. But then the realist faces a problem: given the connection between predictive success and truth, one should expect the predictively more successful theory (i.e., the different incompatible models) to be closer to the truth than the less successful one (i.e., the unified theory). That, clearly, is the opposite of what the realist wants to hold.
In our case, the models can be 'unified' into a composite model of the system. It is this procedure which now explicitly restricts the domain of each model from the whole system to a region. Such composite models are, on my interpretation, unifications of different perspectives on the system. They provide approximations to solutions of the unified theory and we shall see that-contrary to Morrison's claim-in going from the original models to the composite model, no losses in predictive or explanatory power are incurred. Given Morrison's argument, the realist seems to have two options in situations of the sort discussed: (i) she can refuse to apply the success-truth inference to the models, insist on treating them instrumentalistically, and reserve the truth claim for the unifying theory. In the absence of a plausible justification for such differential treatment of models and theory, this appears ad hoc.
(ii) She can infer to the truth of the models but then has to find a way of dealing with Morrison's claim that the models' truth preempts the truth of the unified theory. What the realist needs in this dilemma is an understanding of the models that neither treats them as mere instruments, nor takes them literally so that the theory comes out as farther from the truth than the models. In the following, I explicate such a way of understanding the models as perspectival models.
Perspectival models from singular perturbation problems
The flow of liquids is described by the Navier-Stokes equations which I take as my example of a unified theory. Through the choice of appropriate boundary conditions and approximations, the equations can be adapted to different systems. Of interest here is the kind of system in which a liquid of low viscosity flows around immersed solid bodies or along solid walls. As we shall see, such systems are described by two models, one in which the liquid appears to have no viscosity (an 'ideal liquid') and one in which viscosity is assigned to the liquid. The first model is intended to be used at great distances of the flow from the solid boundary; the second model is intended to apply to the liquid close to the boundary.
The models should derive from the unified theory as different approximations for different circumstances. One might suppose that each region-far from the wall and close to it, respectively-gets assigned its own intrinsic property of viscosity, or some suitable measure of it, which indicates how 'important' the liquid's viscosity is in each region compared to other forces. So we do not expect the same (undivided) system to be treated by mutually inconsistent models; rather, different sub-systems or regions are to be handled by different models. Why should the scientific realist have a problem here?
Let's first see what the different circumstances amount to and how they motivate the construction of separate models. The Navier-Stokes equations, our unified theory, describe the motion of a liquid under three kinds of force: inertial forces, forces arising from pressure gradients, and those arising from viscosity (cf., e.g., van Dyke [1975] , pp. 124ff.):
The left-hand side summarizes the inertial forces; on the right-hand side the pressure and viscous forces are listed ( r is the density of the liquid, v the flow velocity vector, p the pressure, and h the viscosity). We make the general assumption of incompressibility for the liquid (r ¼ const.) and steady flow (@v/@t ¼ 0). To adapt the equations to the system we are interested in, boundary conditions are imposed: at the solid surface v · n ¼ 0, i.e., the liquid does not penetrate into the wall; and v Â n ¼ 0 at the wall, that is, the liquid is at rest in the surface of contact with the wall (it does not slip along the wall). The Navier-Stokes equations (1) can be simplified into the equations for an 'ideal' (i.e., non-viscous) fluid, provided that the viscosity term against the inertia term is small. In order to facilitate the comparison of the magnitude of these terms, the whole equation has to be rewritten in a non-dimensional form which requires the introduction of a 'characteristic' length L and velocity V for the system, so that, e.g., v ¼ V v 0 . 2 With the dimension-free (primed) quantities (1) becomes
where Re ¼ VLr/h, the Reynolds number, measures the size of the inertial term compared to the viscous term. The condition that the latter be small against the former is equivalent to:
For Re ! 1 we thus obtain the Navier-Stokes equations for ideal fluids, the Euler equations (the primes are now suppressed):
Intuitively, the Euler equations should describe the flow far away from the wall. Close to the wall, however, where the (non-dimensional) velocity changes rapidly from |v| % 1 to v ¼ 0, the viscous term in (1) becomes large because r 2 v is considerable here. Therefore, we do not expect (3) to describe the system in this region; a different model, based on a different approximation of (1), is required. This model will have to accommodate the viscosity term in some form or other.
According to the realist interpretation sketched above, we might expect that a further model, for the region near the wall, should be constructed by giving up on the assumption Re ! 1 which underlies the Euler model. Perhaps the fluid in this region should be assigned a different (smaller, finite) Reynolds number. Apart from the fact that this strategy would be completely ad hoc (which number should be assigned?), no simplification of the NavierStokes equations would result, and instead of designing a model for the specific circumstances near the wall we would have to deal with the full unified theory there.
The limit of large Reynolds numbers (corresponding to small viscosity or large velocity) obviously cannot produce two different models; it rather leads only from (1) to (3), the Euler equations, which fail in the region close to the solid boundary: they imply, for instance, that a solid body moving through the inviscid fluid experiences no resistance ('d'Alembert's paradox'). Nevertheless, the different models actually used do not derive from ascribing different Reynolds numbers to different regions of the system. In this sense, the models assign only one intrinsic viscosity-related property to the whole system. The required different models arise by introducing, in addition to the limit Re ! 1, two spatial 'perspectives' into the system: one that is 'nearsighted' in the sense that it magnifies the region close to the boundary, and another that is 'far-sighted' in that it lets the boundary region shrink to zero.
3
Each model, as we will see, is formally a model of the whole, undivided system, not a description of a sub-system. The situation is therefore very much like in classical arguments for anti-realism (e.g., in Berkeley), where the realist is confronted with the claim that one and the same external object cannot have incompatible properties, such as square and trapezoidal shape. The realist answers by exhibiting a description of the situation which explains the apparently incompatible properties as the result of different spatial perspectives onto the same object.
Let me explain the procedure in more detail using a simple equation instead of the actual Navier-Stokes equations. (All the features relevant to my purpose and described informally above will be illustrated in this example.) As a substitute for the Navier-Stokes equations, we consider an ordinary differential equation:
with initial value u(0) and a small parameter « multiplying the highest-order derivative (analogous to the parameter (1/Re) in (2)). We pretend not to know the exact solution in order to simulate the more realistic case where we in fact do not know it. As above, we are interested in the limit « ! 0 (corresponding to Re ! 1). Proceeding according to the usual perturbation technique, expanding the solution u(x) in a power series in increasing powers of the small parameter «:
we find, as the first approximation to u(x):
This approximation works nicely for large x and therefore corresponds to the Euler equations in the hydrodynamics case. But the approximation will inevitably break down for x ! 0, since it cannot satisfy the initial value assignment u(0) ¼ 1. Around x ¼ 0, in other words, something 'new' (from the perspective of the approximation (6)) happens which lies outside the scope of the approximation. That this has to happen is obvious from the fact that equations (4) and (6) are of different type: a differential equation, (4), that can satisfy an initial value assignment, and an algebraic equation, (6), that has no freedom to adapt to such value assignments. This means that u(x) does not uniformly converge towards u 0 (x) as « ! 0; there is pointwise convergence, but the limit relation does not hold uniformly for all values of x in the domain over which we seek solutions to equation (4):
The standard technique to deal with such 'singular perturbation problems', involving non-uniform limits, is to develop two models of the whole system which differ in the way they view the spatial 4 extension of the system. One model-one approximation to (4)-treats the system at a 'large' spatial scale and will therefore be sensitive mostly to the behaviour farther away from x ¼ 0 (flow farther away from the wall in the original problem). The other model uses a 'small' spatial scale and will accordingly be sensitive to what happens close to x ¼ 0 (close to the wall), i.e., to the non-uniform behaviour of u(x). The first model is derived from (4) in the limit « ! 0 (corresponding to Re ! 1) by the ('regular') perturbation approach sketched above; it uses the spatial variable x and leads to (6) (analogous to the Euler equations (3)). The second model, by contrast, arises from (4) as a perturbation expansion in the same limit « ! 0 but uses a 'stretched' spatial variable X: x ! X ¼ x/«, which, in the «-limit and with X taken to be fixed, magnifies the region around x ¼ 0. With this new spatial scale, we obtain another perturbation expansion of the solution of (4):
This leads now, in first approximation, to the equation for the second model:
with solution
This function, in contrast to u 0 (x), is able to satisfy the initial value condition u(0) ¼ 1 if we set A ¼ 1. (See Figure 1. ) As x becomes larger, u 0 (X) will rapidly tend to 0 (for any « > 0) and hence break down as an approximation for u(x) in the domain of larger x. The non-uniformity of u(x) close to x ¼ 0 is reproduced for u(X) when X ! 1.
In the hydrodynamic case, equation (9) corresponds to the Prandtl or boundary layer equations which are derived from (2) in analogous fashion (cf. van Dyke [1975] , pp. 126ff.). Since the mathematical details of the derivation are more involved, I will just state the main result. In the case of two-dimensional steady flow past a flat surface (with coordinates x > 0, y ¼ 0), the variable y, measuring the distance perpendicular to the surface, gets re-scaled according to Figure 1 . The dotted curve in the figure is u 0 (X), the dashed curve u 0 (x), the solid curve is the exact solution.
and the y-component of v according to
Using the boundary conditions for Y ¼ 0 (no-slip condition) and for Y ! 1 (far away from the surface, the inviscid model (3) should hold), the boundary layer equation becomes:
or, in the original variables:
Although (1) was subjected to the limit Re ! 1, we find in the resulting model still the viscous term with 1/Re-as it should be in the region close to the boundary. But notice that the two models (3) and (11) are not derived from the unified theory (2) by assuming different values of Re for different regions of the system. That is, contrary to the earlier suggested realist interpretation of 'incompatible' models of a system as models treating separate regions of the system differently with respect to their intrinsic properties, the singular perturbation technique reviewed so far consists in developing two different models of the whole system, assuming the same intrinsic property for each, viz., large Re. The procedure results in two models with apparently different assignments of intrinsic properties to the same system. But the details of the model construction reveal that it is not assumed that one region has viscosity while the other region lacks it. What happens, rather, is that we look at the whole system, characterized by large Re, from different perspectives or under different spatial scales. Depending on the choice of perspective, the fluid flow will appear to be viscous or not. The important point for the realist here is that the two different spatial scales or perspectives are different assumptions with respect to a relational property of the system rather than with respect to one of its intrinsic properties, such as viscosity. Relational properties can vary without change in the system itself. 'Incompatible' assumptions about relational properties are harmless for the realist because they do not imply incompatibility with respect to intrinsic properties. That's why the realist can here imitate the traditional response to anti-realist arguments like Berkeley's about the shape of an object: what look like incompatible intrinsic properties in our models are only ascriptions of intrinsic properties from different perspectives.
It is worth pointing out that calling our models perspectival is appropriate in the analogy with visual perspective-in fact more appropriate than calling (e.g., in discussions of relativity theory) the description of a system in a frame of reference with some coordinate system a perspective on that system. The analogy with visual perspectives breaks down for the latter kind of case because what is so described in a frame does not suffer from the marginal distortions that are characteristic of visual perspectives (cf. van Fraassen [2004] , p. 797). In our case, the descriptions given by the models become 'unsharp' at the 'edges': the Euler model, for instance, does not describe the flow near the wall adequately at all (cf. d'Alembert's paradox, above).
Unification of perspectives without losses of explanatory power
We have so far looked at the construction of two different models for the system under consideration, given the existence of a unified theory. My claim was that this procedure is best understood as the formulation of different perspectival models of the whole system. If we now start from the opposite side, that is, if we are in possession of the two models and pretend not to know the unified theory, we can simulate a case of theory unification: the two models can be synthesized into a composite model of the system. It is at this point that the different perspectives have to be fitted together into a coherent description of the system. This composite model will preserve the adequate descriptions each original model gives of a region of the system and avoid the inadequate claims each original models makes about the other model's region. In other words, the composite model will be a uniform approximation to the unified theory T, an approximation that is adequate over the whole domain of T.
This technique of constructing a composite model is, as I will argue, similar to some processes of theory unification which Morrison has recently analyzed in detail (Morrison [2000] ) and which she used to raise the problem for scientific realism mentioned above. According to Morrison, the existence of a theory that unifies different sub-theories or models is not sufficient to ensure a realist interpretation of the models as different approximations to the (supposedly) true unified theory. The problem she discovers is that the process of theory unification typically involves a loss of explanatory and descriptive power due to the abstraction from details that is necessary in order to give a unified account of different phenomena. But if the unified theory has less explanatory or descriptive power than the disunified models, then the realist's insistence on the connection between successful exercise of this power and the (approximate) truth of a theory is compromised. If the unified theory is less successful, it can't be closer to the truth than the more successful disunified models.
What are the characteristic features of theory unification in Morrison's view? She distinguishes two kinds of unification: reductive unification, 'where two phenomena are identified as being of the same kind' (e.g., in
Maxwell's identification of light with electromagnetic waves), and synthetic unification, 'which involves the integration of two separate processes or phenomena under one theory', a descriptive unification without an accompanying 'ontological reduction' (Morrison [2000] , p. 5). In the latter cases, it is 'perfectly commonplace to have a high-level structural unity within a theoretical domain in the presence of a disunity at the level of explanatory models and phenomena' (Ibid., p. 34).
Our hydrodynamic example is obviously intended to be analogous to synthetic theory unifications. Thus, the example first of all has to satisfy the requirement that the two models, T 1 and T 2 , do not reduce to T. We adopt a notion of reduction that is most natural in this kind of context (cf. Nickles [1973] , Batterman [1995] , Rueger [2000] ): T 1 reduces to T just in case there is a uniform limit in which the solutions of T go over into the solutions of T 1 ; in other words, given a perturbation expansion for u(x) ¼ u 0 (x) þ «u 1 (x) . . ., we require that lim «!0 u(x) ¼ u 0 (x) for all x.
5 This is the sense of reduction in which, for instance, (some parts of) Special Relativity Theory go smoothly over into Newtonian Mechanics, and hence Newtonian Mechanics reduces to Special Relativity. But we have already seen that for T and T 1 there is no such uniform limit-relation (and similarly with T and T 2 ). T is not just T 1 plus some ''small'' corrections; when we pass on to the limit « ¼ 0, we see that T describes behaviour that is quite different (at least in some parts of the domain) from the behaviour described by T 1 . So the case of our theories is clearly not one of reductive unification. (The non-reducibility of T 1 to T also captures at least some of the sense in which Morrison characterizes the models of T in the hydrodynamic case as 'autonomous'; cf. Morrison [1999] .) But is the hydrodynamic example a case of synthetic unification? We have two distinct theories or models, each of which represents a particular 'mechanism' that is responsible for what is happening in the fluid: T 1 , the Euler equations, describes an inviscid flow, while T 2 , the boundary-layer equations, describes the effects of viscosity near a wall on the flow profile. Morrison has written of this example (which she treats as a case of two different models of one and the same theory) that we have here 'a representation of different kinds of flows in different regions of the fluid' ([1999] , p. 53). Does T synthetically unify the models (in Morrison's sense), or is T perhaps a 'mere conjunction' of T 1 and T 2 rather than a true synthesis? Morrison imposes a condition on true syntheses: 'The mathematical structure of the theory [i.e., T] must be general enough to embody many different kinds of phenomena and 5 Note that this view of theory reduction focuses on solutions to the equations of a theory rather than on the equations themselves. This will introduce some equivocation in the following discussion. For instance, when I talk below about an 'approximation to a theory T', I mean 'an approximate solution to the equations of T'.
yet specific enough to represent the way in which the phenomena are combined' ([2000] , p. 33). In typical cases, she argues, synthetic unification has the consequence that you cannot derive T 1 and T 2 from T without introducing new information (see, e.g., Ibid., p. 136). This is, of course, what we find in our case: in order to arrive at T 1 or T 2 from T, we have to introduce different limits; the non-uniformity of these limits implies that a derivation of T 1 and T 2 from T is not possible. It seems, therefore, that the unification of T 1 and T 2 into T cannot be classified as a case of 'mere conjunction' but rather satisfies the condition of a genuine synthetic unification. This example illustrates for Morrison a general claim about synthetic theory unifications: the separate models of the fluid are more explanatory than the general theory (the Navier-Stokes equations) because the models 'incorporate more detail about structural dependencies than high level theory' ([1999] , p. 63):
The more general the hypothesis one begins with, the more instances or particulars it can, in principle, account for, thereby 'unifying' the phenomena under one single law or concept. However, the more general the concept or law, the fewer the details that one can infer about the phenomena. Hence, the less likely it will be able to 'explain' how and why particular phenomena behave as they do. ([2000], pp. 19-20) Typically, Morrison claims, we have to expect that unifications are accomplished by constructing descriptions that ignore, or abstract from, many details of the descriptions-to-be-unified. It is such details, however, which are important for the sense in which she understands 'explanation'.
But does the hydrodynamic case (and structurally similar ones) really show such a reciprocal relation between the explanatory power and generality, and thus unifying power, of the theories? Let's return to the simple example of equation (4) to discuss the issue. Given the solutions to T 1 and T 2 , we can form a 'composite approximation' to the 'full' theory T by combining the 'outer' expansion u 0 (x) and the 'inner' expansion u 0 (X) (cf. Holmes [1995 ], pp. 48ff., or van Dyke [1975 , pp. 94ff.). Such a combination of different approximations is possible because we can eliminate from each expansion the part in which it fails and which should be replaced by the other expansion. Thus, in the 'outer' region (x ! 1), the inner solution u(X) ¼ e ÀX is approximately (to order «) constant, i.e., u(X) ¼ 0. In general, however, this would be a non-vanishing contribution; call it C. C has to be corrected for in the composite solution, which should therefore include a term -C. In the 'inner' region (x ! 0), the outer solution u(x) ¼ x is approximately (to order «) constant, viz., u(x) ¼ 0. This 'erroneous' contribution, which in general will again be C, should also be corrected for in the composite expansion. The term -C removes this contribution. That both solutions contribute the same 'wrong' term C stems from the fact that u(X) and u(x) 'match' each other in an overlap region « ( x ( 1: in this region we have u(X) % x ¼ u(x), for small x. The composite approximation becomes therefore
What we get from this procedure is an approximation to T that is now uniformly valid over the whole domain of T. Note that the composite expansion still contains both spatial scales, x and X. Hence it reproduces exactly the features that gave rise to the introduction of two different approximations for different regions of T. The 'mechanisms' that were incorporated in T 1 and T 2 are preserved in the uniformly valid approximation; no loss of explanatory power in Morrison's sense can be diagnosed. In going from the separate theories to the unified theory, we have not lost any detail that was included in the separate theories. But we have not really gone from T 1 and T 2 to T. We have stopped at an approximation of T. Thus, there still is a gap between our result and the unified theory with its unknown exact solution. Could one argue that the loss of explanatory power should be ascribed to this transition from the approximate solution to the exact theory? Perhaps-but this sort of loss would clearly not be typical of theory unifications but would, rather, affect any theory that has to be applied approximately. Cartwright ([1983] ) discussed such losses long ago, but even if we accept her claims, in our case it remains a loss that is not due in any specific sense to the process of unification. Thus I would claim that there are genuine cases of theory unification that do not involve the sort of explanatory loss that Morrison sees as typical for unifications.
Perspectives as different levels of a system
I have characterized the models discussed so far as perspectives on the system modelled. The intended sense of this characterization was that even though each model was a model of the whole system, different spatial regions of the system are viewed differently by the models-one region, for instance, gets enlarged or stretched compared to another. This interpretation of the modelling strategy can be applied just as well to models which describe not different regions of the same system but the same system at different levels, e.g., a microscopic and a macroscopic one. We have models of systems at a microscopic level, at a small spatial scale-descriptions in terms of a discrete atomistic structure-and seek other descriptions from a more coarse-grained perspective, at a larger spatial scale-representations of the systems as continuous. Or we already have continuous (macroscopic) models of the systems and want to explore their relation to microscopic (discrete) models. The case of representations of water as a continuous medium and as an assembly of molecules is often mentioned in the philosophical literature (e.g., Teller [2001] ); here I use the example of a discrete model of a solid rod and the distribution of temperature over its length in comparison with a continuous description of the rod and the temperature distribution. 6 The technical problems in going from such microscopic models to macroscopic ones are similar to the difficulties encountered when we performed the limit (7) in the hydrodynamic case (or, rather, in the simplified example (4)). The obvious way of going from a discrete description at a small scale, indicated by the spacing l between individual atoms of the rod, to a continuous description at a larger scale, characterized by the macroscopic length L of the system, is to let the ratio l/L ¼ « ! 0. This reflects the intuitive requirement that the macroscopic representation smoothes out the details at the micro level. To obtain an approximation to the solution T(x) that is valid over the whole length of the system, one introduces two spatial scales, the micro scale x and the macro scale X ¼ «x ¼ (l/L)x. It is now possible to show that the macroscopic temperature distribution (which depends only on X, not on the micro scale x) arises as a first approximation from the microscopic model.
In order to get two models in the hydrodynamic case, we needed, in addition to the limit 1/Re ! 0, the scale X apart from x. Now we need, in addition to the limit l/L ! 0, the scale X in order to get a continuum description from the microscopic description. As in the Navier-Stokes case, it is natural to interpret the need for X, in addition to the continuum limit l/L ! 0, as the need for a (spatial) perspective. Under this perspective, the macro description comes out as a first approximation of the solution of the micro equation.
Introducing the macro scale into the microscopic description of a system reveals features characteristic of macroscopic bodies, e.g., properties such as the measured (macro) temperature T or the 'effective' (macro) conductivity of the rod. To use a phrase that now has some currency in the philosophy of mind: different scales allow us to 'see' different patterns in the distribution of physical quantities; a behavioural pattern may be pertinent in a description at the macro level, but may be lost in a micro-level description of the same system. Recall Putnam's famous case of the round peg of 1 inch diameter which does not fit through a square hole in a board of 1 inch diagonal extension (Putnam [1975] , pp. 295ff.). Putnam compares two possible explanations of this fact, a microscopic one in terms of the arrangement of molecules in peg and board, etc., and a macroscopic one in terms of the geometrical relations between the macroscopic objects involved. Although Putnam does not consider the issue in such terms, it seems clear that an explanation of the macro behaviour of the objects involved in terms of the micro description would 6 Cf. Holmes ([1995] , pp. 224ff ). The model is, of course, illustrative only; it has obvious deficiencies, e.g., that the relevant notion of temperature would not be defined at the atomic level. For a more detailed discussion of this case see Rueger ([2004] ).
have to take the form of an asymptotic analysis analogous to the case considered above (Rueger [2004] ). We can expect a non-uniform limit relation between the micro-and macro-structural descriptions and thus the introduction of a macro scale into the lower-level description will be required, demonstrating the partial autonomy of the higher level-analogous to the partial autonomy of the models in the hydrodynamic example, which was expressed in the fact that the models cannot be reduced to the NavierStokes theory. It should be pointed out that perspectival models are not restricted to models incorporating a spatial perspective (which provides for the analogy with visual perspectives). All the types of perspectival models mentioned above, concerning regions as well as levels, can also be found with respect to time: systems that have periods in their development which evolve faster than other periods can be treated with models involving a 'fast' and a 'slow' time scale. And systems whose evolution occurs at a fast and a slow scale simultaneously (e.g., oscillators with damping) can be analyzed in analogy to the micro-macro example in this section (cf. Holmes [1995] , pp. 106ff.).
Perspectival models, idealizations and pluralism
My proposal was that the realist does not have to treat models, in cases like the ones discussed here, instrumentalistically, but can understand them as expressing different perspectives onto the world. This interpretation makes the models' assignments of intrinsic properties to a system relational: what appears as an intrinsic property of the system is actually a perspectival view of the intrinsic property, hence relational. Conflicts between different assignments to the same system can be resolved in this interpretation, provided the models, through their construction, indeed give different perspectives of the system. The check on this is in the combination of the models into a unified description of the system; if such a combination can be achieved, the models have been shown to provide different but ultimately coherent perspectives.
The notion of perspective used here is on the one hand fairly close to the meaning of visual perspective; on the other hand, it is close to actual modelling techniques (singular perturbation theory). This distinguishes the proposal from other, more metaphorical usages of 'perspective' that have been discussed recently as a response to the incompatible models argument used by philosophers who do not count themselves among the anti-realists. Giere, for instance, has suggested a ''perspectival realism '' ([1999] and [forthcoming] ) which is similar in spirit to my account and which supports a pluralism of models about one and the same system without drawing anti-realist consequences. But Giere's proposal is, of course, meant to be applicable much more generally than to a special class of models. He goes so far as to claim that theories or models like Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism can be characterized in terms of a 'mechanical' and an 'electromagnetic perspective' onto nature (Giere [forthcoming] ). These are clearly metaphors, and it remains to be seen how they can be made more precise. What I have discussed is a formulation of perspectives within the formalism of a theory itself. From within the theory itself, constraints on the extent of pluralism or peaceful coexistence of different models are given.
Teller ([2001] ) has insisted that since all models are idealizations and therefore incomplete (as well as inexact or vague), there should be no conflict among different models of the same system: none of these can lay claim to represent 'the truth' about the system. For instance, we should not treat the microscopic discrete model of water as giving us 'the truth' about water, and the continuum model as a mere fiction. Both models are idealizations, not exactly true, and both reveal insights into properties of water which complement each other: the insights from the continuum model are not superseded or replaced by those from the discrete model. The two models, according to Teller, are incompatible only if we take them to claim to present the exact truth about water; as soon as we recognize them as 'vague' rather than exact representations, the conflict-in principle at least-disappears.
But even if one adopts this view, there is still the task of explicating precisely why such models do not conflict, in what ways they are complementary rather than contradictory. Understanding the models as idealizations or as vague representations is not enough by itself-not all vague models can plausibly be compatible, or 'fit together', just in virtue of being vague rather than exact representations. With the notion of perspectival models, I provide, for a class of models, an interpretation that goes further in explaining the constraints on models that need to be satisfied in order for the models to 'fit together' into a more complete picture of a system. Furthermore, the view I have argued for here is, in a sense, more general than Teller's: even if what Teller claims were false, that is, even if our models were exact representations, the class of models I have discussed could still be understood as perspectival.
